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This article evaluates the theoretical and practical grounds of recent debates around 
Christoph Cox’s realist project of a ‘sonic materialism’ by returning to Gilles 
Deleuze, a key theoretical resource for Cox. It argues that a close engagement with 
Deleuze’s work in fact challenges many of the precepts of Cox’s sonic materialism, 
and suggests a rethinking of materialism in the context of music. Turning to some 
aspects of Deleuze’s work neglected by Cox, the ‘realist’ ontological inquiry Cox 
affirms is challenged through the ‘onto-ethology’ that Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
develop in their A Thousand Plateaus, with this diversely constructive theory of 
relations explicated through musical examples from John Cage and Pauline 
Oliveros. To conclude, this article suggests that Deleuze can indeed be understood 
as subscribing to a materialism, but a materialism that is practical rather than 
doctrinal. 
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Introduction: ‘Deleuzian sound studies’ revisited 
For over fifteen years the philosopher Christoph Cox has been developing a distinctive and 
influential sonic ontology, what he has variously named a realist, materialist, or naturalist 
account of the nature of sound (see, among other pieces, Cox 2003; 2006; 2009; 2011).1 
This has recently led to the publication of his monograph Sonic Flux: Sound, Art, and 
Metaphysics (2018a), in which Cox draws on philosophers including Gilles Deleuze and 
Friedrich Nietzsche and canonical figures in experimental music and sound art such as 
John Cage, Pierre Schaeffer and Christian Marclay in order to put forward the most 
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complete theoretical explication of his ‘sonic materialism’ (4, and passim) yet.2 Through 
this project Cox has been a key figure in arguing for sound art as a field deserving of serious 
philosophical inquiry, as well as in taking the realist and materialist inclinations of 
philosophy’s ‘speculative turn’ (Bryant, Srnicek and Harman 2011) and the ‘ontological 
turn’ in the arts and humanities (Kane 2015) and putting them to work in the field of sound. 
 Cox is not alone in embarking on such a project through the thought of Deleuze. 
Like the attempt to go ‘beyond representation and signification’ (Cox 2011) that Cox’s 
Deleuzian inquiry into sound involves, there is a widespread sense that Deleuze offers the 
means to break with the ‘metaphysics of being, representation, and identity’ that is 
purported to characterise the mainstream of cultural theory and which is said to be 
inadequate to dealing with music, sound, and noise (Herzogenrath 2017, 3). But it is 
precisely this characteristic of work on Deleuze and sound that in 2015 led Brian Kane to 
charge Cox and others within what he names ‘Deleuzian sound studies’ with premising their 
accounts of the nature of sound on a misguided approach to ontological inquiry, an 
approach that cannot but conceive of sound in an essentialist manner (2015). By 
emphasising the Deleuzian ‘virtual’—understood as a realm of difference and inexhaustible 
potential that is the condition for the stable objects, subjects, and identities of the empirical 
‘actual’—these theorists, Kane argues, necessarily neglect the ways in which sound as an 
object of study is inextricably bound up in historical, cultural, and institutional formations 
(2015, 15-16). For Kane this, in turn, leads to these theorists affirming an opposition within 
the study of sound, between an ‘auditory culture’ that inquires into such formations and a 
‘sound studies’ that takes as its focus the essential nature of sound. 
 In the few years since the publication of Kane’s article, the debates and conflicts it 
names have only amplified. The starting point for my discussion here will be the critical 
positions on Cox developed by the sound theorists Annie Goh and Marie Thompson. 
Informed by Kane’s critique of ‘Deleuzian sound studies’, Goh and Thompson have 
 
2 Other theorists have described their approach to sound as a sonic materialism, most prominently 
Salomé Voegelin (2014, 5). While there are overlaps between Cox’s sonic materialism and that 
of Voegelin and others, I intend to focus on Cox here first in order to engage with some of the 
problems his sonic materialism poses as precisely as possible, and second to provide a platform 
for another perspective on what a specifically Deleuzian sonic materialism could look like. 
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separately argued that, in failing to provide an account of the cultural and political 
contingency of given epistemological situations, the ontological turn in sound studies risks 
rendering invisible the racialised and gendered characteristics of our discourses on sound 
(Goh 2017; Thompson 2017a). Cox has since responded to the criticisms from Kane as 
well as those from Goh and Thompson, suggesting that Kane’s understanding of what 
constitutes ontological inquiry is unnecessarily restrictive (Cox 2018a, 131-33) and that Goh 
and Thompson repeat the errors he finds in the mainstream of cultural theory by taking an 
anti-realist position that reduces nature to culture (Cox 2018b). While I affirm aspects of 
his response to Kane, I find that his response to Goh and Thompson does not adequately 
respond to the problems they raise, and moreover I believe that elements of this response 
are symptomatic of the blind spots that Goh and Thompson diagnose in his thought. In 
particular, by ascribing an anti-materialist position to Goh’s and Thompson’s projects in 
marked contrast to their own affirmations of materialism, Cox raises many questions 
regarding how we are to understand his own commitment to materialism. 
 In this article I am going to take what I find to be lacking in Cox’s response to Goh 
and Thompson as a catalyst for rethinking what we could mean by a Deleuzian sonic 
materialism or Deleuzian sound studies. I aim to suggest an opening of this term in light of 
the diverse forms Deleuzian work on sound takes, and in particular through the ‘Deleuzian 
turn’ that is said to have taken place in musical research (Macarthur, Lochhead and Shaw 
2016). This Deleuzian turn appears to have a quite different set of commitments than the 
avowed realism of what Kane calls Deleuzian sound studies, with the editors of the recent 
volume Musical Encounters with Deleuze and Guattari, for example, stressing a continuity 
between this Deleuzian work on music and ongoing research in cultural musicology 
(Moisala et al. 2017, 8). By inquiring into the philosophical conditions of this apparent split 
within ‘Deleuzian sound studies’ itself, or a gap between ‘Deleuzian sound studies’ and 
what we could call ‘Deleuzian musical research’, I aim to provisionally outline an alternative 
Deleuzian sonic materialism to that developed by Cox. 
 This article will proceed in three parts. First I will briefly sketch out the central 
features of Cox’s sonic materialism. In the key second part I will outline the criticisms of 
Cox put forward by Annie Goh and Marie Thompson, as well as Cox’s responses to these 
criticisms, and take the Goh-Thompson-Cox exchange as an opportunity to consider what 
Cox means when he says that he is a realist. Third I will turn to some aspects of Deleuze’s 
work neglected by Cox, specifically the importance to Deleuze’s thought of his 
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collaboration with Félix Guattari and of the philosophy of Benedictus de Spinoza, and 
suggest that the ‘onto-ethology’ developed by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus 
challenges essentialist ontological inquiry in favour of a diversely constructive theory of 
relations. I will explicate this with musical examples from John Cage and Pauline Oliveros, 
and conclude by suggesting that Deleuze can indeed be understood as subscribing to a 
materialism, but a materialism that is practical rather than doctrinal. 
Cox’s sonic materialism 
My focus here is on what I take to be three, perhaps the three, core features of Cox’s Sonic 
Flux project. First is his opposition to what he calls ‘orthodox cultural theory’ (Cox 2018a, 
16), a broad term encompassing approaches including psychoanalysis, phenomenology, 
poststructuralism, and deconstruction. Second is his ontological divergence from this 
‘orthodoxy’ towards a sonic materialism, realism, or naturalism centred on the concept of 
the ‘sonic flux’ (2). Third is his claim that, contrary to Kane’s position that sonic ontology 
constitutes a sound studies ‘without’ auditory culture, there is in fact a complementarity 
between sonic ontology and auditory culture, as evidenced through Cox’s claim that human 
expressions ‘contribute’ to the sonic flux. The weight of the debates around Cox’s position 
lies in this third aspect: the claim of a complementarity between approaches to sound. The 
key question is of what this complementarity looks like, and if Cox’s account can 
accommodate cultural inquiry as he suggests it can, or if it necessarily diminishes the 
auditory culture side of sound studies. 
 On Cox’s account, orthodox cultural theory is intrinsically linked with a rejection 
of realism. For this theory, ‘culture’ is construed as a ‘system of signs’ from which there is 
no way out; that is, through which there is no access to extradiscursive reality (15). (This 
already raises a crucial question—namely, why does requiring a mediation between the real 
and subjective experience amount to a denial of reality?) Furthermore, Cox takes the 
position that the analytical frameworks of orthodox cultural theory, frameworks that 
operate in terms of representation and signification, are ‘confounded by the sonic’ (3). Cox 
thus links two arguments together in his rejection of orthodox cultural theory—first that this 
orthodoxy holds a ‘deep suspicion’ towards any notion of a ‘fundamental reality’ that 
exceeds representation and signification (15), and second that the methods of orthodox 
cultural theory are in some way inadequate to dealing with sound. As Cox puts it, ‘[t]he 
theories of textuality, discourse, and visuality at the heart of cultural theory remain largely 
5 
 
unresponsive to the sonic, failing to confront the powerful, asignifying materiality that 
characterizes so much experimental work with sound’ (14).3 
 As such the link between these two arguments is found in the ‘powerful, asignifying 
materiality’ that sound has some relation to. This signals the next, and most important, 
feature of Cox’s thought: the reason for Cox’s rejection of ‘orthodox cultural theory’ is that 
the very nature of sound eludes its analytic strategies. And what is the nature of sound? Cox 
seemingly makes this clear when defining his concept of the sonic flux, understood as ‘the 
notion of sound as an immemorial material flow to which human expressions contribute 
but that precedes and exceeds those expressions’ (ibid.). This position is materialist insofar 
as it affirms that matter is, in the final analysis, all there is—that ‘thought depends on matter, 
but matter does not depend on thought, language, or conceptualisation’ (6). It is realist 
insofar as it maintains that reality is ‘mind-independent’—that ‘the flows of matter and 
energy that fundamentally constitute the world are autonomous from the human mind and 
indifferent to our beliefs, desires, and descriptions of it’. Sonic flux is not the only material 
flow, and, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari as well as Manuel DeLanda,4 Cox speaks of 
the flux of matter and energy being ‘articulated into various layers or strata’ (30), naming 
among these the physiochemical, the organic, genes, money, and language. But the sonic 
flux has a special status for Cox, insofar as it ‘elegantly and forcefully manifests’ the other 
flows of the natural world (3). The exceptionality of the sonic, for Cox, derives from its 
purportedly distinctive resistance to representation (133), its characteristics of ‘temporality 
and ephemerality’ that evade objectification and identification (152). 
 But Cox’s project towards a sonic ontology has a second aspect. Alongside an 
account of the sonic flux in general—that is, as a material flow—there are ‘more regional 
analyses of its capture and coding by various nonhuman forces and assemblages, and by 
human communities and social formations’ (7). It is in this respect that experimental music 
and sound art are important to Cox’s project, with Cox noting that sonic flux is ‘a sensuous 
 
3 The term ‘asignifying’ derives from the work of Deleuze and Guattari, referring in the first instance 
to Guattari’s attempts to develop a form of semiotics in which sign behaviours are not reducible 
to acts of signification. I will return to the question of semiotics later. 
4 DeLanda’s A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, where he enumerates diverse ‘flows of matter 
energy’ (1997, 28), seems of particular importance to Cox. 
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reality discovered, investigated, and manifest by experimental composers and sound artists 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries’ (31). Much of Sonic Flux is given over 
to documenting a potted, ‘nonlinear’ history of these moments of the capture of the sonic 
flux, broadly outlined as constituting a departure from the symbolic art of music, where 
‘chords and ratios give way to frequencies and vibrations, logic to physics, and musical 
meter to physical time’ (87). As Cox puts it, ‘[i]f music belongs to the symbolic, then sound 
belongs to the real’. In this way, for Cox, a sound installation 
can do more than merely reveal itself to be an entity among other entities. It can disclose 
the material forces that generate entities and can thus thwart the reification that would take 
such actual, empirical things as constituting the whole of ontology. (133) 
This concern with artistic works and a certain art history suggests why cultural inquiry into 
practices with sound can serve, as Cox puts it, as a ‘vital extension’ of the theory of sonic 
flux. An extension, perhaps, but what is less clear is whether Cox leaves any room for 
cultural theory to make any genuine contribution to the theory of sonic ontology. In order 
to address this question I turn now to the criticisms of Cox’s thought developed by Annie 
Goh and Marie Thompson. 
Cox and his critics: what is Cox’s realism? 
Goh and Thompson integrate critiques of Cox into their own distinct projects. In the case 
of Goh, this involves a contribution to the field of archaeoacoustics that attempts to account 
for the particular situated knowledges of the listeners of the past (2017, 283). In the case of 
Thompson, it concerns the argument that an uninterrogated racialised perceptual 
standpoint risks undermining the capacity of work within the ontological turn in sound 
studies to hear the violence that whiteness enacts (2017a, 266).  
Goh draws on work in feminist epistemology, particularly that of Donna Haraway, 
in order to challenge the perpetuation of traditional metaphysical dualisms in the field of 
sound studies (2017, 283).5 Chief among these dualisms are those of subject-object and 
nature-culture, and Goh proposes revisiting debates in sound studies concerning the ‘nature 
of sound’ with Haraway’s notion of ‘natureculture’ in mind. For Goh, while Cox purports 
 
5 See Haraway (1988). 
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to overcome the Kantian divide of noumenon and phenomenon, in his attempts to do so 
he in fact perpetuates another set of classical dualisms, among them reason and desire, 
matter and language, and nature and culture, neglecting both ‘the problem of the body’ and 
‘the processes of knowledge production’ that seem, in their own ways, to span each of these 
divisions (286). By opposing the ‘mind-independent reality’ of ‘sound-in-itself’ to an 
‘orthodox cultural theory’ in which nature is presented as only a projection or construction 
of culture, Cox, Goh argues, perpetuates a division between the ontology of the object and 
the epistemology of the subject, a division that reinstitutes the command of a masculine-
coded subject over feminine-coded nature (287). Against this position, Goh proposes 
adopting Karen Barad’s notion of ‘onto-epistemology’ and emphasising ‘the co-constitution 
of knowledge through material phenomena, apparatuses, and discursive practices between 
human and non-human actors’ (287). What onto-epistemology implies, then, is the 
‘inseparability of ontology and epistemology, nature and culture, language and matter’. 
Thompson’s engagement with Cox is somewhat more direct and central to her 
argument. She is concerned with what she calls the ‘origin myth’ of the ontological turn, 
where ‘old’ questions of ‘culture, signification, discourse and identity’ are rejected in favour 
of a turn to the realist and materialist themes that Cox favours (2017a, 266). Like Goh, 
Thompson uses the term ‘onto-epistemology’ to ‘foreground the entanglement and co-
constitution of ontology … and epistemology’ (279n26). She contends that Cox’s concern 
with the ‘nature of sound’ risks ‘uncritically naturalizing’ the specific onto-epistemology that 
underlies it (270), arguing that Cox’s ontology is predicated on what she calls, following 
Nikki Sullivan, a ‘white aurality’ (266). This white aurality, says Thompson, silences the 
historical traces of its constitution (269).6 Thompson does not aim to dismiss Cox’s project 
of a sonic ontology, but rather to emphasise its situatedness and bring attention to the 
‘particular historical, geographic, social, aesthetic, epistemological and technological milieu’ 
that makes the formulation of the theory of sonic flux possible (273). The risk of white 
aurality, Thompson argues, is of amplifying the material dimension of sound at the expense 
of giving due consideration to its sociality (274). 
What both Thompson and Goh wish to contest in Cox’s sonic realism is, in 
Thompson’s words, a perceptual standpoint that is ‘both situated and universalising’ (266), 
 
6 See Sullivan (2012). 
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a viewpoint that presents itself as neutral and unmarked by context, and thus at least 
potentially all-encompassing. Across these two pieces, Goh and Thompson repeatedly 
stress that their goal is not to reject ontological inquiry per se, but to situate and contextualise 
the ontological claims we make, with Goh turning to the challenges that feminist 
epistemology has made towards the supposed neutrality of scientific knowledge (2017, 283) 
and Thompson to the black studies scholar Fred Moten’s notion of a ‘paraontology’ that 
faces up to the exclusion of blackness from (existing) ontologies (2017a, 268).7 Both 
thinkers themselves affirm a certain kind of sonic materialism, with Goh making reference 
to the ‘sonic ways of knowing’ that Julian Henriques considers in his account of reggae 
sound system culture (Goh 2017, 290; Henriques 2011) and Thompson to the ‘phonic 
materiality’ that Moten associates with the resistance of the object to subjective control 
(Thompson 2017a, 280n51; Moten 2003, 1). 
With this in mind, Cox’s response to the critiques of Goh and Thompson is 
surprising. In this response, Cox attempts to argue again for the complementarity of sonic 
ontology and cultural analysis, and to clarify how he understands this complementarity. Cox 
sees two options. In the first, which he claims Goh and Thompson take, the real is 
conceived as a social construct, folding nature into culture and ontology into epistemology. 
In the second, which he says he takes, culture is conceived as an outgrowth of nature (Cox 
2018b, 234). For Cox, only his approach is viable. But this distinction, I argue, does not 
face up to the criticisms that Goh and Thompson develop. To reiterate, their argument is 
rather that any ontology and any account of the real or of nature must face up to the 
epistemological position from which it is posited. In Thompson’s words, ‘[o]ne does not 
have perspective, but is in and (re)produced through perspective (2017a, 274): it is not that 
the things of the real world are cultural constructions, but that our experience of the real is 
inextricably bound up in our contingent epistemological perspective. Thompson is clear 
on this: 
In arguing that Cox’s sonic ontology is reliant on perspective, I am not seeking to affirm 
that there can be no sound without a listening subject, nor am I seeking to deny that sound 
has something to do with materiality and matter. Rather, what I wish to foreground is the 
role of white aurality in constituting a sonic materiality that can be cleanly distinguished as 
 
7 See Moten (2013), as well as Chandler (2014). 
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preceding sociality, discourse, meaning and power, and its role in consequently defining 
the virtues of ‘modest’ sound art. (Ibid.) 
On this basis it is difficult to see why Cox claims that ‘[o]nto-epistemology supposes that 
the material real offers no ontological resistance, that it can be carved into whatever shape 
suits a subject, culture, or language’ (236). Cox, it seems to me, gets the criticisms put 
forward by Goh and Thompson backwards. What they are challenging is not the autonomy 
of nature or the object, which is not their topic of concern, but rather the autonomy and 
authority of the subject. To say that ontology and epistemology are inseparable is not to say 
that nature does not exist without culture, but only that the very human project of 
ontological inquiry is inseparable from epistemology. When Cox says that for Goh and 
Thompson ‘the things to which ontology refers are products of human perception and 
conception’ (ibid.), he attributes to them a position they do not hold.  
This misattribution plays out further in Cox’s response to the accusation that his 
position is Eurocentric (Goh 2017, 287; Thompson 2017a, 272), where he notes that 
intellectual traditions seeking to describe the nature of reality are far from exclusive to 
Europe (Cox 2018b, 237). This is certainly the case, though the extent to which these 
diverse traditions constitute ‘realisms’ that can be meaningfully linked to each other is a 
matter for comparative philosophy. But moreover, as Robin James has noted, the premise 
of Goh’s and Thompson’s positions is that whiteness and Eurocentrism are not ‘one option 
among fungible, interchangeable options’ (2018): what white aurality does, on Thompson’s 
account, is render its position invisible, and in so doing invisibilises the relationships of 
domination and subordination it holds with other positions (2017a, 272).8 We can agree 
with Cox’s statement that we ‘cannot avoid having ontological commitments and making 
ontological claims’ (2018b, 235) and envision realisms that are in some way competing, in 
dialogue, or irreducibly plural, and Cox alludes to allowing for such a stance. But, as 
Thompson argues through her ‘white aurality’ thesis, it is hard to see how we could situate 
Cox’s position within such a framework. 
Cox’s response, then, fails to deal directly with many of the theoretical questions 
asked of him. Indeed, it may primarily serve to provoke more questions. Some of these 
 
8 Similarly, Christopher Swithinbank has convincingly argued that what is neglected in the recent 
materialist concern with ‘vibration’ is an account of power (2018). 
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questions persist from Sonic Flux: when Cox reaffirms at the close of his response to Goh 
and Thompson that ‘the sonic flux is immemorial, preceding and exceeding human 
contributions, but … it is profoundly shaped by cultures, societies, languages, and politics’ 
(240), it remains unclear what form this ‘profound shaping’ takes. By adopting a Deleuzian 
account of passive synthesis, Cox aptly depicts the emergence of mechanisms that ‘capture, 
filter, and structure’ the sonic flux—the ear, recording technologies, and so on—but in what 
way, through what mechanisms, these biological evolutions and cultural artefacts then act 
back on the sonic flux such that they are more than merely epiphenomenal remains, in my 
view, unclarified. And with this remains the question of in what way cultural inquiries serve 
as ‘vital extensions’ of the inquiry into sonic flux—if what they are addressing is indeed 
epiphenomenal, then what can they tell us about the sonic flux itself? 
Drawing my persisting questions for Cox together is a desire for him to clarify the 
sense in which he is a realist. A tension is present within Cox’s position through his 
affirmation of a scientific realism. When he claims, puzzlingly, that Thompson’s onto-
epistemological challenge to the ‘origin myth’ of the ontological turn constitutes a 
‘creationist’ attempt to ‘undermine established scientific knowledge’ (237), he provokes the 
question of how he himself understands the workings of scientific knowledge. Cox states 
that the ‘situated yet universalizing’ position that Thompson attributes to the subjective 
stance of white aurality ‘is simply a description of knowledge itself’ (238), and follows this 
with a defence of knowledge that transcends particularity: 
 
Of course it is true that scientists, historians, and moral theorists are particular human 
subjects situated in particular social and cultural contexts; but these subjects regularly make 
claims that transcend this particularity, offering evidence and arguments that establishes 
their conclusions as knowledge—knowledge compelling not only to themselves and their 
local group but to anyone who follows the chain of reasoning and evidence. (Ibid.) 
 
This is a justifiable, if contestable, claim within the philosophy of science. But it is surprising 
to hear from a philosopher defending a position that seems grounded not in the workings 
of normal science9 and universal reason, but in an ontological reading of a Nietzsche who 
 
9 The term used by Thomas Kuhn to describe the everyday workings of scientific practice within a 
scientific paradigm (1996). 
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famously stated that ‘[t]here is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival knowing’ 
(1998, III: 12). What Nietzsche’s perspectivism entails has been the subject of much 
debate, and, like his related notion of interpretation, it seems to be more than an 
epistemological category, with Cox noting the expansiveness of Nietzsche’s sense of 
interpretation (2018a, 80-81, 160-61). But it is nevertheless difficult to see how the 
Nietzsche who both philosophically and performatively affirmed a plurality of 
interpretations and perspectives could be said to adopt a ‘universalising’ position with 
regards to knowledge, and in what ways Nietzschean perspectivism could be said to differ 
from the perspectivism Thompson proposes. This, to say the least, requires clarification. 
Similarly, Cox defends his position against the critique put forward by Brian Kane 
first with recourse to debates in metaontology, in which the notion that ‘ontology does not 
come in degrees’ (Kane 2015, 12) has been challenged through the explication of a plurality 
of senses in which ‘to exist’ can be understood (Cox 2018a, 131).10 This may seem like an 
aside, as he takes this statement as a point from which to affirm his own alternative 
Nietzschean-Deleuzian-DeLandian ontology. But when Cox then states that rejecting 
ontology ‘would make no sense at all’ as ‘ontology simply describes the set of entities one 
takes to exist’ (2018b, 235), we must ask how he is accommodating the interpretive and 
ethical charge of Nietzsche’s thought that renders Nietzsche’s work as a challenge to 
ontology as commonly understood, and that characterises the rethinking of ontology that 
Deleuze attempted from at least his 1962 reading of Nietzsche (Deleuze 2006a) onwards. 
Deleuze is explicit on this: in a presentation delivered in 1967 he stresses that the classic 
ontological question, ‘what is this?’ (2004, 94), may limit from the beginning the kind of 
inquiry we are able to embark upon, and he argues for a multiplication of the questions we 
ask. It should not only be a case of ‘what exists?’, but also, and more so, ‘who? how? how 
much? where and when? in which case?’ (96). This multiplication underlies the pluralism 
that Deleuze will come to emphasise across his work, leading to the paradoxical ‘magic 
formula’ of his and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, ‘PLURALISM = MONISM’ (1987, 20). 
Cox, in his responses to Kane, Goh, and Thompson, turns to defending a certain 
kind of realism, and a certain conception of ontological inquiry that breaks with a Frege-
Russell-Quine philosophical lineage—that is, a conception that breaks with the notion of 
 
10 Cox’s reference point for this position is the survey volume by Berto and Plebani (2015). 
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existence being determined by a single existential quantifier, in favour of a multiplication of 
modes of existence.11 But these defences do not appear to be defences of Cox’s own realism 
and ontology. Recourse to the authority of analytic metaontology and normal science does 
not seem to help Cox’s argument, and may in fact hinder it, confusing what exactly his 
particular notions of realism and ontology involve. Not only this, such a slippage between 
conceptions of realism and ontology may signal a more fundamental problem in Cox’s 
thought.  
One of Cox’s affirmations of scientific realism is telling in this regard. He states, 
citing Maurizio Ferraris (2014), that ‘[k]nowledge of the fact that water is H2O requires 
concepts and language; but that water is H2O is independent of any human knowledge or 
apprehension’ (2018b, 236). But what it means to make such a claim is far from self-evident. 
Indeed, Hasok Chang, in his detailed historical and philosophical study Is Water H2O?, 
takes debates around this very question as an opportunity to reevaluate how ‘realism’ has 
functioned in science and the philosophy of science and to argue for an irreducible 
pluralism in scientific practice and theory, while yet maintaining a form of realism (2012). 
This example makes clear something that Cox does not acknowledge, namely that 
challenges to the kind of realism he seems to favour emerge not only as part of a 
continuation of anti-scientific postmodern cultural theory in the arts and humanities, but 
well within the mainstream of the philosophy of science. When Cox responds to Goh’s 
and Thompson’s engagement with Haraway he remarks that she was a former professor of 
his, but does not discuss how he would respond to the ‘modest witness’ argument that 
underlies Thompson’s critique of him (Cox 2018b, 240n17; Thompson 2017a, 266; 
Haraway 2004). When Goh—citing not only Haraway but Evelyn Fox Keller, Susan Bordo, 
and Sandra Harding, among others—gives Cox the opportunity to respond to feminist 
perspectives from within the philosophy of science, instead of taking this opportunity Cox 
turns to polemic, denouncing Goh and Thompson as harbouring a general anti-science 
(and even ‘creationist’) attitude. 
Running parallel to the complexity of these debates on realism in philosophy, 
science, and, indeed, the arts, Cox’s understanding of what the real is seems quite simple: 
it is material flux. Cox’s realism seems to declare not only that reality is in some sense mind-
 
11 Kris McDaniel’s recent The Fragmentation of Being is also informative on this point (2017). 
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independent, but that we can—and do—know what it is. We have the impression that Cox 
derives this from the natural sciences, but without clarity on his position within the 
philosophy of science and science more generally it is not clear what justifies this assertion, 
or that of his theory of the sonic flux. Even the most traditional questions of the philosophy 
of science—is the theory of sonic flux falsifiable?—seem difficult to answer. Lost is a sense 
of how ‘realism’ and ‘materialism’ are terms of significant debate, and how ‘matter’ is a 
famously slippery term, not least within the arts and humanities.12 The declarative character 
by which Cox’s exposition of the theory of sonic flux often unfolds can be thrilling, but it is 
equally liable to raise the questions of why we should accept his account of the real, how it 
could accommodate the perspectivism or pluralism that seems apt of the Nietzschean or 
Deleuzian position he claims to be taking, and, moreover, by what means we could 
persuade him of another position. 
Sonic materialism and Deleuzian materialism reconsidered 
The Nietzsche-Deleuze conjunction takes us to the crux of my contention with Cox’s sonic 
realism. In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze argues that ‘matter’ is a secondary notion to 
that of force and the relation of forces (2006a, 7), and notes that for Nietzsche physical 
concepts like matter cancel out or equalise the work of forces (45). The issue with idealism, 
on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, is not that it fails to be materialism, but that both 
positions neglect the more fundamental problem of difference (129).13 And Deleuze seems 
 
12 On this point, and more generally for another significant Deleuzian alternative to Cox’s sonic 
materialism, see Schrimshaw (2017). Cox aligns himself with speculative realism, but he does 
not affirm the most common means by which theorists associated with that tendency justify their 
claim to realism, such as a rationality that allows ‘thought to think beyond itself’ that Suhail Malik 
argues for in a dialogue with Cox (Joselit, Lambert-Beatty, and Foster 2016, 26). Without 
recourse to something like this rationality it can be difficult to determine first of all why human 
notions such as language and subjectivity should in any way be opposed to nature, and second 
by what means we could then ‘translate humanity back into nature’ as Cox desires. For Cox the 
human seems a remarkably unremarkable feature of the universe, and so it is unclear why the 
behaviours of humans should be any less real than anything else. 
13 Cox’s earlier work in the history of philosophy does in fact ascribe such a position to Nietzsche, 
regularly posing perspectivism as a challenge to the unified truths of metaphysical and scientific 
realism (see, for instance, Cox 1999, 47-50). It is not clear to me what underlies the apparent 
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consistent in arguing that a physical account of matter is not enough, even if the valence of 
the term ‘matter’ itself changes through his work with Guattari. From his reading of 
Nietzsche through to the necessary distinction between semiotic expression and physical 
content in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 143), across Deleuze’s 
thought we find various formulations of a complex link between the corporeal and the 
incorporeal.14 
 For Cox, ‘force’ seems to be a property of physical matter, or perhaps a synonym 
for it. While the status of ‘matter’ changes in Deleuze’s thought, physical matter remains 
not an explanatory notion but a notion that must itself be explained. Cox, on the contrary, 
can readily declare sound to be ‘a physical, intensive force’ (2018a, 14) and refer to intensive 
differences operating at the level of ‘physical, chemical, and biological matter’ (28), among 
many other examples. Cox seems to conceive of matter as physical, and accessible in its 
physicality. On Cox’s account we know perfectly well that the world consists of physical 
matter and physical matter alone, and we know how this matter behaves. We know that the 
flows of matter are articulated in different ways, but also that one stratum of articulation, 
the sonic flux, in some way reflects matter’s fundamental behaviour in a particularly 
immediate way. And we know that sound art is interesting because it allows us to experience 
something of the sonic flux and thus something of the reality of matter itself. This seems to 
necessitate an ontological hierarchy that is not present in Deleuze’s thought, where physical 
matter stands over and above the ideal and the incorporeal. What is at issue in the criticisms 
of Cox is not, then, that he claims that culture emerges from nature, which for a certain 
definition of nature would be accepted by everyone in the debate. It is rather that for Cox 
physical nature at its most uncaptured and unchanneled is the standard against which all 
levels of articulation are judged. While different strata are said to have relative autonomy 
(30), it is difficult to see how the sonic and material flux can be anything but an 
overdetermining reference point for realms like language and culture. 
 
shift Cox’s thought undergoes with regards to realism, so I will not consider how his theory of 
sonic flux relates to this earlier work. I am, however, left wondering what the consequences of 
carrying the Nietzschean terminology of perspectivism from an ‘antirealist’ context (161) into a 
realist one are. 
14 On this see Colebrook (2014). 
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To put this in different philosophical terms, ultimately my objection to Cox’s sonic 
realism, and to his reading and use of Deleuze, concerns how he conceives of the relation 
between the finite and the infinite. For Cox, the infinite seems nameable as material flux, 
and this is the perspective that he starts from. From this starting point, finite beings seem 
necessarily subordinated to this higher order. This is the position that Alain Badiou 
critically attributes to Deleuze (2005, 74), arguing that Deleuze’s notion of the virtual asserts 
a totalising monism, with the finite beings of the actual forming only ‘superficial stampings 
or simulacra’ (2000, 96, 74) of an affirmed infinite (72). On Badiou’s account, Deleuze 
adopts a position that Éric Alliez describes as a ‘last phenomenology’ (2001, 30), what 
Badiou himself calls a ‘natural mysticism’ (2004, 80) through which there is a ‘giving up of 
all interiority’ (2000, 86). This is presented as a phenomenological gesture, but a ‘last’ 
phenomenological gesture, because it adopts a subjective position of immersing oneself in 
an absolute ‘outside’.15  
Badiou’s reading of Deleuze, where actual beings are relegated to an effectively 
epiphenomenal status as effects of the virtual, is echoed in Brian Kane’s reading of 
‘Deleuzian sound studies’. Will Schrimshaw also links this to a phenomenological position 
with regards to Cox, suggesting that there is a phenomenological notion of matter at work 
in sonic materialism, a matter that is sensed and experienced (2017, 113).16 And as Timothy 
Bewes similarly argues regarding the adoption of the Deleuzian term ‘affect’ (2018), by 
 
15 This is also something like the position Quentin Meillassoux takes when he criticises the 
‘subjectivist’ character of the notion of ‘Life’ or ‘a Life’ in Deleuze’s late work, which on 
Meillassoux’s account ‘absolutizes’ features of subjectivity (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 72-
73). When Cox departs from Meillassoux by arguing that Meillassoux does not have an adequate 
account of time (Cox 2018a, 167-68), I suspect that Meillassoux’s response would be that Cox’s 
notion of time is itself subjectivist, a transcendental conception of time that does not depart 
enough from the Kantian position. 
16 While Cox rejects any association between Deleuze and ‘idealist’ philosophies like those of 
phenomenology and of Kant (2018a, 28), Deleuze’s relation to these philosophies is much more 
complex and vexed than Cox suggests. For example, in Deleuze’s own words, the philosophy of 
difference emerges from the exploration of a ‘furtive and explosive moment’ in Kantianism itself 
(1994, 58). Cox’s denial of any such continuing link raises the question of how and to what extent 




giving a complete conceptual determination to our nonhuman, beyond-human ‘outside’, 
be it nature, matter, or affect, by rendering it substantial and knowable, a reified 
experiencing subject is affirmed, purportedly in the name of an external objectivity. This 
seems to me the precise philosophical position that Goh and Thompson challenge in their 
arguments against Cox, a position where we finite experiencers are said to experience the 
infinite in its fullness. But this does not seem to be the position on the finite-infinite relation 
that Deleuze takes. 
Badiou’s reading of Deleuze is marked by a constitutive exclusion that is echoed by 
what I believe to be a constitutive neglect in Cox’s reading of Deleuze, both centring around 
the figures of Benedictus de Spinoza and Félix Guattari. While Cox asserts himself to be 
developing a Deleuzian ‘immanent metaphysics’ (2018a, 6), he makes only passing mention 
of Spinoza, Deleuze’s exemplary philosopher of immanence. Badiou, meanwhile, does 
address Deleuze’s Spinoza, but he omits what I take to be the key aspect of Deleuze’s 
reading of Spinoza’s ontology, namely Deleuze’s demand that ‘substance turn on finite 
modes’ (Deleuze 1992, 10; Deleuze 1994, 304), that ‘substance must itself be said of the 
modes and only of the modes’ (1994, 40). What Deleuze is opposing here is an 
understanding of Spinoza’s thought where the infinite, eternal substance of ‘God, or 
Nature’ (Spinoza 1994, E IV, Preface) takes primacy over the finite things of the world that 
are its expressions, where any identity of the finite seems to be dissipated and absorbed into 
the infinite.17 Deleuze argues, on the contrary, that the infinite is not conceivable other than 
through the procedures of the finite. As with Goh’s and Thompson’s defence of a certain 
materialism, this is not to deny the existence of a reality exceeding any subjective 
apprehension of it, but only to insist on the conditional relation that finite things have to 
any such reality. 
This position can, admittedly, be difficult to conceive through the logic of 
actualisation—naming the passage from virtual to actual—that underpins the philosophical 
framework of Difference and Repetition,18 but it comes to be clarified through Deleuze’s 
 
17 This is the position Hegel lays out in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1995). 
18 Though if we take individuation and not actualisation to be the key to Difference and Repetition, 
as I think we should, we find a somewhat different character to the relation. But more than this, 
the ‘virtual’ of Difference and Repetition is not composed of anything like an indeterminate 
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work with Guattari. To sum up what Guattari contributes to Deleuze’s thought following 
their encounter in the late 1960s is far beyond the scope of this article, but I will name a 
few suggestive features.  
First is the notion of transversality, described by Guattari as early as 1966, in the 
context of clinical psychotherapy, as ‘a dimension that tries to overcome both the impasse 
of pure verticality and that of mere horizontality: it tends to be achieved when there is 
maximum communication among levels’ (Guattari 2015, 113). While naming a directly 
practical concern here—and for Guattari the practical is never far away—such a notion 
comes to be extended far beyond the psychotherapeutic institution, as in Guattari’s late 
formulation of ‘The Three Ecologies’ (2000). Guattari here expands the notion of ecology 
beyond nature to social relations and subjectivity (especially collective subjectivities), three 
realms that obtain relative autonomy but which any successful political project must bring 
into a kind of equilibrium (3). In order to theorise such a combination of intrinsic relation 
and relative autonomy, Guattari devoted a great deal of his theoretical efforts in the 1970s 
and 1980s to semiotics, producing a Hjelmslev-Peirce hybrid conception of signs that can 
be heard throughout A Thousand Plateaus.19  
For Guattari, unlike Cox, dismissing semiotics in favour of a concern with the 
material real would not be comprehensible—even the most material of inquiries involves 
dealing with signs, even the most minimal discursive rendering of natural processes involves 
a translation into signs, and even the natural sciences are not concerned with the discovery 
of external realities but are always involved in constructive and creative processes with signs 
(1984, 90). The aim is not to access nature or the real in itself, but rather to recognise that 
‘signs pervade even physical fluxes’ (88), or, in the translation favoured by Éric Alliez and 
Gary Genosko, to make ‘signs work flush with the real’. 
 
material flux, but rather of determinate ‘Ideas’. This is a term that Deleuze draws from Plato 
and Kant in order to elaborate the link between the finite activity of posing problems and the 
way in which these problems come to transcend their finite origin. I elaborate on the ‘Idea’ as a 
response to Brian Kane’s ‘Deleuzian sound studies’ argument in Campbell (2017). 
19 This particular conception that is present in A Thousand Plateaus is developed across Guattari 
(2012) and is presented in its most complete form in Guattari (2011). 
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These two strands of an upturned Spinoza and Guattari’s semiotics are combined 
in A Thousand Plateaus with the work of the early twentieth century ethologist Jakob von 
Uexküll, producing Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘onto-ethology’. Uexküll analyses 
biological life in terms of its Umwelt or milieu, showing not only the process of co-
constitution that takes place between animal and environment, but furthermore stressing 
that what is under consideration is less the animal than the diverse relations and affects that 
can take place within the inaccessible whole of the environment (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 257). From Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza they add to this an experimental impulse, 
a concern with the unanticipated and unanticipatable. For Spinoza ‘no one has yet 
determined what the body can do’ (1994, E III, P2, Scholium), of what affects it is capable, 
the signs it can emit and encounter. The question of what finite bodies can do (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 256), rather than the question of infinite nature in its fullness, guides 
Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of nature as a vast set of experimental practices 
constructing new relations. 
This is but the briefest of outlines, and this is only one way of approaching these 
problems: as Simon O’Sullivan has vividly shown, starting from the perspective of the finite 
allows Deleuze to construct many diverse and complex formulations of how this can then 
relate to the infinite (2012). Another reason why I will not elaborate this image of Deleuze 
and Guattari in detail here is that instances of such alternatives to Cox’s sonic materialism 
are already at work in what we could call ‘Deleuzian musical research’. Among many other 
examples, Edward Campbell outlines a possible Deleuze-Guattarian contribution to the 
field of musical semiotics in his influential Music After Deleuze (2013), while Marie 
Thompson herself develops a rich account of musical experimentation through a reading 
of Deleuze’s Spinoza (2017b). But I will offer two brief examples that are deserving of 
further inquiry, both concerning composers who Cox credits as contributing to his theory 
of sonic flux but whose work can be seen with a renewed richness when read differently to 
how Cox requires. 
First is John Cage, and the ‘number pieces’ that were his musical focus in the final 
years of his life. Contrary to Cox’s insistence that ‘Cage’s music is … always about the sonic 
real, sonic materiality itself’ (Cox 2018a, 93), my claim here is that these works are 
concerned with a diverse and complex set of relations. The system for writing these 
‘number pieces’ was remarkably simple, using chance operations to determine time 
brackets, sometimes fixed and sometimes flexible, within which performers can sound 
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notes from a small selection (Cage and Retallack 1996, 122). From these basic conditions, 
a great variety of pieces emerged, with the methods used saying little of their performative 
potentials—from cacophony to an austere subtlety that may have been Cage’s tribute to his 
late friend Morton Feldman. The vast plurality of relations taking place at many levels 
between score and performance leads to a striking diversity of outcomes from similar, 
minimal materials. One of the most significant aspects of these pieces is their inclusion of 
a degree of improvisation and performative freedom, in contrast to the negation of selfhood 
that Cage demanded in earlier works. Benedict Weisser argues that these pieces allowed 
for Cage a ‘reconciliation with certain elements of musical expression he had previously 
treated with diffidence’ (2003, 177), and we can see with these works that Cage maintains 
his challenge to performative individualism, but resituates it, not in the demands of the 
composer or a fidelity to a transcendent ‘nature’ or ‘sound-in-itself’, but in the listening 
capacities of the performer and their sensitivity to their environment. 
Weisser also remarks on the significance to Cage’s late compositions of his 
encounter with Pauline Oliveros’s work Deep Listening (179). In his response to Goh and 
Thompson, Cox notes the importance of Oliveros’s notion of the ‘sonosphere’ to his 
theory of sonic flux (2018b, 239), and they do seem to have much in common: Oliveros’s 
account of the sonosphere suggests an interest in sound in all of its primordial materiality, 
‘beginning at the core of the earth and radiating in ever increasing fractal connections, 
vibrating sonically through and encircling the earth’ (2011, 163), and she describes her 
approach to improvisation as involving ‘listening to everything that I can possibly perceive 
in order to tune to and flow with the Sonosphere’ (2006, 481). In Douglas Kahn’s words, 
Oliveros takes the sonosphere to ‘[resonate] among personal and interpersonal, musical, 
earth, and cosmological scales informed by physics and metaphysics’ (2013, 174), and Kahn 
notes the influence of the spiritual tradition of Theosophy on Oliveros’s articulation of an 
‘experiential physics’ that allows listeners a certain immediate contact with the natural world 
in a way that mathematical modelling in the sciences denied (176). But as this suggests, 
affirming the existence of the sonosphere is far from the extent of Oliveros’s musical 
practice, and it is coupled with the cultivation of subjective and intersubjective practices of 
listening (2005) and social practices, with Martha Mockus noting the specificity of collective 
lesbian sociality in Oliveros’s work (2008). 
Rather than taking aim at ‘nature’, the sonosphere, or sonic flux alone, what we see 
in these images of Cage and Oliveros are composers trying to navigate between the ‘three 
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ecologies’ of nature, society, and subjectivity, to remediate the relation between them, and 
to renew the constructive and creative role of the listener-performer in relation to an 
ontology of sound. Such an approach is premised not on the affirmation of the ultimate 
value and determination of the infinite real or of nature, but in finite experimental practices 
based on the dictum that ‘we do not know what a body can do’. This pluralises the ways we 
understand sound: it becomes a transdisciplinary object that is at once and irreducibly 
natural, social, and subjective in character. The absence of audile techniques (Sterne 2003) 
or listening subjectivities from Cox’s analyses risks, as Goh and Thompson have argued, 
silencing the social and the subjective, risks failing to account for how these are constituted 
and why we would want to cultivate diverse practices and modes of listening, and risks losing 
the sense of what we refer to when we speak of ‘nature’. 
Concluding remarks: a final note on materialism 
 
What now of materialism? I still wish to affirm that Deleuze is a materialist, but not in the 
way that Cox supposes him to be. A distinction offered by the philosopher Patrice Maniglier 
is useful for framing this. Maniglier says of a dogmatic materialism that it follows what he, 
citing an Encyclopedia Britannica definition, names the Materialist Credo: that ‘all facts 
(including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are 
causally dependent on physical processes, or even reducible to them’ (2018). Against the 
problems that such a physicalist materialism raises, some of which I have been addressing 
here, Maniglier proposes another materialism. This materialism is a task, a practice that 
faces up to the materialities we encounter—matter itself among them, but also work, the 
body, race, gender, power relations—and accepts that these are not objects ‘out there’ 
waiting to be represented by us.20 On the contrary, this materialism concerns an openness 
to what Deleuze calls a ‘thought of/from the outside’ that may shatter our epistemological 




20 This aligns with Etienne Balibar’s account of Marxism, at least in one of its phases, as a ‘strange 
materialism without matter’ (2014, 23). While I do not want to go quite as far as embracing such 




are critical elements that cannot be taken on board without changing the very way we 
represent things in general and altering the very position of the activity of representing 
things in the balance of our practices. They can be said to exist in the exact measure as they 
change us … Which is not to say that they exist only for us, since it is not we who are the 
measure of their existence … They are outside of us, although it would make no sense to 
posit them as objects of representation. (Maniglier 2018) 
 
Rather than accommodating the materialities of gender and race as Goh and Thompson 
ask of him, Cox affirms with DeLanda that ‘historically, left political thought has been 
staunchly realist’ (2018b, 240), and elsewhere argues that realist philosophical positions are 
‘driven by a rigorously democratic and atheist egalitarianism that seeks to restore the value 
of universality, equality, and truth’ (Eşanu 2018, 76). For Cox, citing Badiou, philosophical 
realisms ‘advocate a rejection of identitarian, cultural, and communitarian particularism in 
favour of a properly democratic universalism and cosmopolitanism’ (77).  
By opposing particularity to universality Cox fails to accommodate the complex 
relation between the two that Deleuzian political thought seems to demand, what 
Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc has precisely captured by reading the diverse practices and 
struggles that constitute Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming-minoritarian’ through the lens 
of their Marxism (2009). This issue is reflective of the tensions present throughout Cox’s 
combination of Deleuze and realism, where finite practice is dismissed in favour of the 
absolute of the universal. It strikes me that what Deleuze has to offer to sonic materialism 
is not this, but rather a materialism of accepting our finitude, our contingency, and our 
mutability, and of facing up to the problems this poses. 
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